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“Civil Religion” and Confucianism: Japan’s Past,
China’s Present, and the Current Boom in Scholarship
on Confucianism
KIRI PARAMORE
This article employs the history of Confucianism in modern Japan to critique current
scholarship on the resurgence of Confucianism in contemporary China. It argues that
current scholarship employs modernist formulations of Confucianism that originated in
Japan’s twentieth-century confrontation with Republican China, without understanding
the inherent nationalist applications of these formulations. Current scholarly approaches
to Confucianism trace a history through Japanese-influenced U.S. scholars of the mid-
twentieth century like Robert Bellah to Japanese imperialist and Chinese Republican
nationalist scholarship of the early twentieth century. This scholarship employed new
individualistic and modernist visions of religion and philosophy to isolate fields of
“Confucian values” or “Confucian philosophy” apart from the realities of social practice
and tradition, transforming Confucianism into a purely intellectualized “empty box”
ripe to be filled with cultural nationalist content. This article contends that current
scholarship, by continuing this modernist approach, may unwittingly facilitate similar
nationalist exploitations of Confucianism.
Considering the achievements of our long national history, the fate of the world
some centuries from now may well be to see our nation assimilate and refine
even Western culture. I firmly believe this is our nation’s great aspiration and
indeed its manifest destiny.
– Hatoyama Ichirō, Minister for Education and Culture, January 27, 1934, at
the inauguration of the Association for the Propagation of Japanese Confucian-
ism (Nihon Jukyō Sen’yōkai 1934, 15)
Americans have, from the beginning, been aware of the responsibility and the
significance our republican experiment has for the whole world.
– Robert Bellah, in “Civil Religion in America” ([1967] 2005, 53)
Robert Bellah’s passing, coming as it does in the midst of a new boom in writing on the
politics of Confucianism, is cause to reflect on how meta-theories on the place of religion
in political society have been treated, and are being treated, in Asian studies scholarship.
The volume and impact of Bellah’s work was monumental, but one theory that he rather
quickly distanced himself from in the 1970s and 80s appears to currently be experiencing
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a resurgence—at least in commentaries on Confucianism. “Civil religion” was an idea
Bellah came up with to try and make sense of his own country, America, during a partic-
ularly challenging episode of its history in the late 1960s. In one of his last interviews,
ironically enough conducted by Anna Sun and Fenggang Yang, authors of recent
volumes on Confucianism, Bellah admitted to being pressed into writing the article
where this concept first occurred, of being uncomfortable with it from the start, and
being particularly uncomfortable with how it was later used by others (Yang and Sun
2014, 6). But even in the original 1967 article in Daedalus that launched the idea,
Bellah already expressed an awareness of the dangers of the concept: “It has often
been used and is being used today as a cloak for petty interests and ugly passions”
(Bellah [1967] 2005, 55). His articulation of the idea of “civil religion,” like much of
his work, was originally historical rather than normative. For him, civil religion was
simply part of the historical and ongoing basis of American politics, a part that needed
careful attention if it were not to be exploited by the “ugly passions” that he saw at
work there. A faint hint of the ideology of American exceptionalism can be discerned
in Bellah’s article, but this only makes it even less likely that he would have originally con-
ceived this model being applied to other places. He was not advocating it as a panacea to
be used in other countries. In fact, conversely, by framing his article as a gentle condem-
nation of America’s war in Vietnam, he seems to have been warning against the imposi-
tion of American models in other lands.
Strange then to see Bellah’s idea of civil religion now being held up by a whole new
generation of social science scholars as a normative concept, and one that should be
applied to other societies—notably China. The resurrection of Bellah’s idea of civil reli-
gion in new normative clothes is actually part of a larger trend visible across humanities
and social science scholarship of resurrecting a number of old meta-theories of culture
and religion to try to understand the explosion in religiosity that is accompanying
China and its satellite states’ juggernaut ride into high capitalism. While works by Feng-
gang Yang and Anna Sun themselves have employed the ghost of Bellah to imagine Con-
fucianism as a “hopeful” civil religion for China, other scholars like Jiang Qing and Chen
Weigang have resurrected Max Weber, or at least sociological models very reminiscent of
Weber, to construct similarly idealistic imaginings of a Confucian-inspired polity in China
or “Greater China” (W. Chen 2014; Jiang 2012; Sun 2013; Yang and Tamney 2012).
The current wave of scholarly writing on Confucianism is thus representative of
more than just a reaction to the resurgence of Confucianism in East Asia and a
growing interest in Chinese tradition. It also marks the resurrection of a range of old
social science meta-theories, and their employment once again to try to understand
the still sticky relationship between religious tradition and modernity. Like the Confucian
tradition itself in some interpretations, these meta-theory-based approaches look back-
wards into the past for academic inspiration. In this article I would like to argue
against this trend and suggest that scholars might try to use newer, more historically
aware academic paradigms, particularly from the disciplines of social history and religious
anthropology, in their endeavors to understand the complex dynamics of Confucianism in
East Asia today. As I will expand upon below, the problem with meta-narratives and meta-
theories on Confucianism is that they tend to ultimately always relate Confucianism to
abstracted “Confucian values,” which in turn usually simply mean doctrinally based
ideas rather than social practices. In order to think about new ways to approach
270 Kiri Paramore
Confucianism during this boom, I agree with Anna Sun (2013, 32–76) that it is essential
to seriously examine the history of the study of Confucianism in the modern world. Such
a historical approach needs to engage European visions of Confucianism (as Sun does),
but also modern Japanese academic visions of Confucianism, which were so influential in
the twentieth century (including in Europe and China, and especially in the United
States). Even more importantly, such a historical approach must include an awareness
of the history of Confucianism in modern Japan’s experience of high capitalism and
empire, an experience that offers obvious parallels to many things occurring in China
today.
CONFUCIANISM, CULTURE, AND MODERNITY
Three problems have consistently confronted modern academic attempts to under-
stand Confucianism in universal or global terms: (1) its deep political valency and conse-
quent close association with states; (2) its traditionally culture-specific identification with
China; and (3) its positionality beyond any single clear modern academic category like
religion, philosophy, or politics.
The strong political valency of Confucianism through most of East Asian history has
led Western academic writing to refer to it most often in political terms, often as a marker
of a particular culture of politics to which certain values are attributed. Recent writing by
international relations scholars like David Kang and Yuan-Kang Wang follows this trend
in using Confucianism as a cultural key to understanding an “other” form of politics to
which particular characteristics of either “harmony” or “violence” are attached (Kang
2010; Wang 2011).1 The works of political philosophers Jiang Qing, Ruiping Fan,
Joseph Chan, and Daniel Bell, although more idealistic and less historical, do something
similar (Chan 2014; Fan and Yu 2011; Jiang 2012). Although their value judgments might
be very different, these contemporary scholars follow a long tradition of representing
Confucianism as marker of the Chinese cultural other. From Hegel through Marx to
Weber, Confucianism was famously used to mark a particular interaction between reli-
gion and state, associated in its most famous Marxian garb with Asian despotism. This
was all part of a complex positioning of Confucianism in a teleological world view that
associated close interactions between religion, state, ethnos, and culture with a “premod-
ern” condition.
In this sense, Confucianism and the Chinese were found to be “problematic” in a
similar way to Judaism and the Jews. Marx’s “Jewish Question” revolved around the
problem that Jewish religious faith, community organization, and structure were too
closely intertwined (Marx 1968, 36–45). This was seen to both originate from and
define Jewish culture and Jewishness itself. So too Confucianism was both characteristic
of and defining of the despotic nature of Chinese society. It was the close ritualistic con-
nection between state and society obfuscating the individual that made it premodern, and
that was precisely the reason why Confucianism could not be classified as a modern form
of philosophy, religion, or anything else. This problem is reminiscent of the problem in-
herent in modern conceptions of religion identified by Talal Asad. According to Asad
1For critical discussion of this trend in international relations scholarship, see Callahan (2012).
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(1993, 45), “the only legitimate space allowed to Christianity [and by implication thus any
other religion] in post-Enlightenment society, [is] the right to individual belief. . . .”
Whereas Asad himself italicizes “belief” in this sentence, one could just as well italicize
“individual.” It was certainly the individual-centered nature of a religion that defined
its modern nature for Marx, and thus precluded Judaism and Confucianism from
being modern.2 This is obviously a problem for anyone wanting to look at “Confucianism
as a world religion,” or indeed anyone wanting to look at Confucianism globally at all.
Scholars specializing in the study of Confucianism, as well as advocates of Confucian-
ism over the past fifty years (and, significantly, these two groups often overlap in the U.S.
and Chinese contexts) have tried to get around these problems by identifying Confucian-
ism with successful (in terms of the materialist values of modernity) societies: notably
Japan, and since the 1980s the “mini-dragons” of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
These societies are Confucian and materially successful in modernity, therefore Confu-
cianism is compatible with modernity—or so the argument implies (Tu 1996). With
the “rise of China,” China itself can be added to this list. Related to this, some of the
same scholars have also argued for the modernity of Confucianism on an intellectual
basis. They suggest that the doctrinal content of Confucianism is particularly suited to
liberal democracy and capitalism. This, in broad-stroke terms, was the approach of
Wm. Theodore de Bary, Tu Wei-ming, and others during the 1980s and 90s (Cohen
1985; de Bary 1983, 2013; Tu 1996). Robert Bellah’s Tokugawa Religion (1985) could
also be read broadly along these Weberian contours.
This approach, through its focus on ideas as values, can also be perceived as an
attempt to present Confucianism in modernized paradigms, facilitating Confucianism
being discussed within the rubric of “philosophy,” or at least within the broader
German field codifier of weltanschauung. In this way, these twentieth-century attempts
to reconceptualize the academic contextualization of Confucianism share similarities with
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century attempts to “modernize” Buddhism. The
modernization of that tradition through reconstruction had at its core a “reclassification”
whereby the tradition was neatly redeployed in an adjusted definition of the Western cat-
egories of either “philosophy” or “religion” (Sueki 2004). Contemporary versions of this
are Daniel Bell’s discussion of Confucianism as philosophy, or Tu Wei-ming’s attempt to
create a “religio-philosophic” category for Confucianism. Importantly, even the simple
approach that argues that Confucianism is a form of modernity also tends to focus on
“Confucian values” rather than ritual or practice, thereby reconstructing Confucianism
primarily in doctrinal or doctrinally derived, ideas-based, or philosophical terms.
In this way, the last century’s responses to the problems of Confucianism’s political
character, Chinese cultural roots, and lack of conformism to modern academic categories
have all actually reinforced the relationship of each of these problems with each other.
CIVIL RELIGION VS. NATIONAL RELIGION: JAPANESE HISTORY AND U.S. NORMS
Anna Sun’s Confucianism as a World Religion (2013), by adding a sociological per-
spective to the traditional ideas-based approach, attempts to open out a new vista on
2For Asad on the modern and premodern inWestern definitions of religion, see Asad (1993, 234–35).
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some of these problems. Sun wants to analyze the reality of Confucianism in China today:
a vibrant religious movement, part of a general religious revival sweeping across greater
China. This attempt to focus on the sociality of the movement positions Sun’s study as
clearly post-Asad. No longer is Confucianism as a non-Western religion simply a premod-
ern throwback from which only the ideas are worth salvaging. Moreover, Sun goes
beyond a sociological survey by framing her study in relation to a range of broader and
very interesting scholarly and political issues: (1) the history of the identification of Con-
fucianism in the modern Western academy as a “world religion,” (2) the recent debate in
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese state scholarly institutions over the
definition of Confucianism, and (3) consideration of what political or social role Confu-
cianism may come to play in relation to the Chinese state in the coming years. Sun
thereby tries to combine a sociological approach and focus on contemporary society
with an awareness of history and engagement with textual scholarship.
Despite the groundbreaking nature of this approach, Sun ultimately fails to get a
sociological analysis of Confucianism off the ground. Although the book’s first three chap-
ters on disciplinary history and debates on discourse are fascinating, the second part
where the sociological analysis is attempted often reads as not much more than lists of
statistics, and the questions in her sociological research, by focusing almost exclusively
on individuals and individual experiences and perceptions of things like “conversion”
and “faith,” actually fall right back into the idea of an individualized modern religion
about which Asad and others have warned. The failure of Sun’s particular sociological ap-
proach drives her to fall back on Bellah’s theory in order to make a conclusion. Sun thus
concludes her book with the rather ambiguous final sentence: “The future of the revival
of Confucianism no doubt holds for us anxiety, but also great hope” (Sun 2013, 183). This
anxiety refers to negative nationalism. In the final chapter, Sun has a subsection titled
“The Politics of Confucian Nationalism,” which she concludes by stating that “there is
a remote possibility that the state might try to mold Confucianism into a form of ‘State
Confucianism,’ like ‘State Shinto’ in Japan” (178). Anxiety, then, is elicited by the idea
of state religion, which is in turn identified through the analogy of Japanese State
Shinto. What the “hope” in the book’s final sentence refers to is her own idiosyncratic
rendering of Bellah’s idea of civil religion as “religious collective conscience without as-
sociation with a specific religion, and civil religion as the political conscience of a demo-
cratic, republican society” (180). Sun seems to see Confucianism functioning in China as
a civil religion within a plurality of religious traditions (182–83). So what the final pages of
the book say is something like: we might be anxious about Confucianism in China becom-
ing a state religion like the dreaded State Shinto, but ultimately it is more likely we can be
hopeful that Confucianism will continue to exist, as it does now, as one element within a
religious plurality that serves as a civil religion for China, that is, a plurality that, following
Bellah, serves as the “religion of the republic.”
Applying a historical lens and a trans-Asian outlook to this conclusion, however, raises
significant problems. It is vital here to recall that the only example Sun gives of the neg-
ative possibility of “state religion” is Japanese State Shinto. However, the deployment of
religion in supporting the modern Japanese state, and particularly the increasingly fascis-
tic state of the 1930s and 40s, was certainly not limited to State Shinto. As recent research
has reiterated, State Shinto was only one of a “plurality” of religious pillars that came to
support nativism, ultra-nationalism, the autocratic emperor system, and ultimately
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fascism in Japan (Faure 1993; Kraemer 2011; Victoria 1997). Once we understand
fascism or ultra-nationalism as forces that arise from within grassroots society, not
simply imposed from above as ideology—as most experts on this phenomenon now
agree—then the role of religion in supporting ultra-nationalism has to be seen on a
broader plane than simply looking at state structures (Yoshimi 1987). Various sects of
Buddhism old and new, new religions, Catholicism—they were all in on the ultra-
nationalist project in mid-twentieth-century Japan, as was Confucianism. So if one
wishes to compare the utilization of Confucianism in China today with the usage of a re-
ligion in mid-twentieth-century Japan, then the religion to compare should not be Shinto,
but the very same religion: Confucianism.
Although State Shinto is often referred to in relation to Japanese imperialist ideology,
the primary ideological form underlying nationalist and imperialist education in schools
and the army was the ostensibly secularist ideology of “national morality.”One could even
describe State Shinto as just one part of the plural civil religious construction that was
“national morality.” The prime academic advocate and ideologue of the national morality
movement was Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944). Inoue, the author of Kokumin dōtoku
gairon (A general discussion of national morality, 1912) and professor of Eastern Philos-
ophy at the University of Tokyo had also authored Chokugo engi (1890), the official state
commentary on the key ideological document of Meiji Japan, the Imperial Rescript on
Education. Chokugo engi was issued to schools together with the Rescript and played
a key role in laying the basis for the ultra-nationalist reaction to the Rescript, including
attacks on liberals and Christians (Paramore 2009, 141–53). Inoue repeatedly empha-
sized the nonreligious nature of national morality, partly because it emerged in competi-
tion to ideas of using Christianity as the basis of the teaching of morals in schools. In
works like A general discussion of national morality, Inoue emphasizes the Shinto
aspects of morality, thereby, through the well-known trope of asserting State Shinto as
nonreligious, identifying national morality with secularism (Breen and Teeuwen 2010).
Inoue not only used the secularist argument to advance one religious tradition—Shinto
—he also used the same trope through the first two decades of the twentieth century to con-
sistently argue for increased use of Confucianism in the national education and ideological
construction of modern Japan. Inoue’s positive evaluation of the Confucian tradition in Jap-
anese history, andhis regard for its suitability for use inmodernmoral education, can be seen
in the introductions to each volume of his monumental historical trilogy on Japanese Confu-
cianism published between 1900 and 1905 (Inoue 1900, 1903, 1905). Through the first two
decades of the twentieth century, Inoue actively lobbied for more Confucian content in na-
tional morality education, while at the same time authoring core national morality texts for
teacher education (Inoue 1912). For instance, in a speech he gave as a public lecture for the
Japan Philosophical Society (Tetsugakkai) in 1908, he argued:
It is good if we have something like Confucianism [in education] because the
aim of Confucianism is pure morality in its broadest sense. Moreover, there is
no impediment to teaching Confucianism in schools because [unlike Buddhism
and Christianity] it does not contradict the natural sciences. (Inoue 1944, 806)
Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was also a regular attendee at this same Japan Philosophical
Society between 1898 and 1908 when he resided in Tokyo. He had met Inoue Tetsujirō
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there already in 1899, and two Liang translations of Inoue’s work had quickly followed
(Fogel 2004, 183). Liang’s conception of gongde (public morality) has also been linked
directly to Inoue’s conception of national morality (Fogel 2004, 207). So the constella-
tions of ideology construction that would influence both the Chinese Republic and its
People’s Republic can be linked historically to Japanese deployments of Confucianism
in the construction of something resembling a civil religion.
Certainly as far as the Japanese case goes, Confucianism is widely recognized as
having provided the primary basis for the curriculum of national morality, and Confucian-
ism came to play an even greater role in Japanese imperial ideology through the 1930s as
expansionist aggression increased and the country drifted towards fascism (Collcutt 1991;
Nihon Jukyō Sen’yōkai 1934; Smith 1959).
The important lesson of the Japanese example is that the kind of nationalist ideology
that ultimately supported fascism was in fact very much a deliberate construction by
Inoue Tetsujirō and others of something not so dissimilar from civil religion as defined
by Bellah. One could argue that Inoue wanted the civil religion, which they called nation-
al morality, to be based in, to borrow Sun’s words summarizing Bellah, a “religious collec-
tive conscience without association with a [single] specific religion, and civil religion as
the political conscience” (Sun 2013, 180). This may indicate that Sun’s assumption,
that admission of a plurality of religions in the state construction of ideology will
ensure something “hopeful,” is perhaps itself a little too hopeful, if not naively ignorant
of historical precedent.
After all, even moving away from Japan to Bellah’s argument made in the context of
the American experience, does American historical reality actually back up Sun’s norma-
tive if not idealistic reading of civil religion’s historic role in American society? As noted
earlier, Bellah himself associated American civil religion in historical reality with some-
times negative forms of U.S. nationalism that have facilitated terrible acts of international
violence similar to those perpetrated by Japan under the regime of “national morality.”3
Bellah’s own reticence to use the term “civil religion” from around 1980 onwards is
related to an awareness of this problematic (Yang and Sun 2014, 6). Sun’s attempt to
adopt Bellah’s idealistic imagination of his own country through the conception of
“civil religion” reminds me of Inoue Tetsujirō’s adoption of early twentieth-century
German imperialist self-imaginings of “national morality.” Inoue’s huge assumption was
that imperial Germany, in terms of the overall function of the relationship between
state, nation, and religion, was an excellent model that should be emulated. I wonder
if Sun is not making the same problematic assumption in her approach to the early
twenty-first-century United States of America.
CULTURAL SPECIFICITY: CONFUCIANISM’S “WORLD”?
Ultimately, this brings us back to consideration of one of the unrealized promises in-
herent in Sun’s title—Confucianism’s global character as a “world religion.” Sun builds on
3Bellah refers particularly to the “anti-revolutionary” conflict which “we have come to stumble
into”—in other words the Vietnam War—in a clearly condemnatory manner (Bellah [1967]
2005, 53).
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the work of Girardot (2002) and others to eloquently elucidate the history behind the po-
sitioning of Confucianism as an element in Max Müller’s academic pantheon of “world
religions” in the late nineteenth century. But she never seriously engages the more
obvious question of Confucianism’s globalization—or, more pertinently, the striking
lack thereof—in world history. In fact, Confucianism is unique among Müller’s “world
religions” in its historic incapacity over thousands of years to ever move far beyond the
geographic region of its inception. Late Ming and early Qing anti-Christian writers some-
times wondered why it was that whereas Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity had all
managed to spread across the globe, the much older Confucianism seems never to
have appealed to anyone West of inner China. In fact, beyond the sometimes Chinese
tributary states of Vietnam and Korea, Confucianism only ever spread to Japan. Japan
is the only example of a country where Confucianism ever spread without some form
of Chinese political dominion. Is it not worth considering why?
Is there something particular about Confucianism’s interaction with the state and
culture that has precluded it from spreading beyond the boundaries of Sinitic states?
In most of its historical manifestations, Confucianism seems to have had a particularly
systematized relationship with the state. Much Confucian ritual and practice also
appear closely tied not only to state rite, but also to culturally Chinese custom. Even
in the one case of Confucianism spreading further—Japan—it is noteworthy that many
of the core ritual practices were ditched in that foreign context (McMullen 1996). Con-
temporary elite forms of Confucianism beyond the Sinosphere (for instance, so-called
“Boston Confucianism”) also choose to not integrate most of the apparatus of Confucian
ritual into their practice—they restrict practice to self-cultivation (Neville 2000). In this
sense, the criticism of Confucianism at the level of academic discourse as “premodern” in
its integrated nature can be seen to also relate to real historical issues. But these real his-
torical issues have not been investigated thoroughly, particularly not outside the Chinese
case. To investigate them requires conceptualizing Confucianism beyond doctrine and
ideas, and crucially beyond the individualized conception of faith and practice about
which Asad warned.
Advocates of modern forms of Confucianism have actually done the opposite of this.
Rather than engaging issues in the sociality of Confucianism, they have tended to sidestep
historic and social problems by simply denying much of the religio-social apparatus of
Confucianism, notably the sociality of its ritual schemes. Instead they have either
overtly, or through their academic practice implicitly, repackaged Confucianism as a phi-
losophy or thought system.
CONFUCIANISM AS PHILOSOPHY, CONFUCIANISM AS ETHICS, CONFUCIANISM AS VALUES
The most overt contemporary example of this is Daniel Bell, a philosopher who con-
centrates attention on the political applicability of Confucianism, especially in relation to
the contemporary Chinese state where he lives and teaches. Bell is thus interested in the
social implications and applicability of Confucianism, but Bell’s Confucianism is overtly
formulated as a philosophy; it is a Confucianism of ideas, or at most values (Jiang
2012). He does not study or include in his conception of Confucianism the ritual
schemes of the tradition or the history or practice of their sociality. Tu Wei-ming,
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although being institutionally positioned in Asian studies rather than philosophy, and
being very sensitive to the religious implications of Confucianism, still defines it
through individual-centered practice based on doctrinal (in his case Song neo-Confucian)
norms rather than through observation of the practice of Confucianism in historic soci-
eties. His idea of “religio-philosophy” is thus primarily a philosophical paradigm that pre-
scribes an individual religious or spiritual experience. If religious at all, it is pure religious
modernity in the terms that Asad defined it.
This contemporary pigeon-holing of Confucianism within the intellectualized cate-
gory of philosophy or thought actually traces a history back to early twentieth-century
Asia. Many scholars who see their study of Confucianism as the study of “Asian philoso-
phy,” “Chinese philosophy,” or “Oriental thought” are heavily influenced by conceptions
of the history of Confucianism generated by Fung Yu-lan (1895–1990) in the context of
the development of Chinese Republican ideology (Fung 1966). Scholars like Fung,
however, rode in the wake of earlier Chinese scholars such as Liang Qichao (1873–
1929) who were themselves crucially influenced by the repositioning of both Buddhism
and Confucianism in relation to philosophy and religion in late nineteenth- early
twentieth-century Japan.
Understanding modern approaches to the study of Confucianism, therefore, re-
quires us to return to the earlier history of Japanese intellectual modernization and its
relationship to developments in China and the West. This in turn brings us back again
to our friend Inoue Tetsujirō. In 1890 Inoue became the first Japanese to be appointed
full professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tokyo. Since his 1882
appointment as an associate professor, Inouès main duty at the university had been to
take charge of the teaching of “Eastern Philosophy.” The main academic contribution
of his career is usually viewed in terms of his attempt in this post, especially during
the late Meiji period, to integrate the teaching of East Asian thought, in particular Con-
fucianism, into a Western academic framework, creating an intellectual history basis of
the “national ethic” as “Japanese philosophy.” Inoue’s most enduring academic works
today are thus not his shrill public writings like A General Discussion of National Moral-
ity, but rather his academic historical work published in the first years of the twentieth
century, which established a field that it is politically correct in Japan today to call the “in-
tellectual history of Japan,” but which until 1945, and in the writing of Inoue himself, was
always referred to as “the history of Japanese philosophy.”4
The academic project of repackaging Japanese Confucianism as “philosophy,”
however, was intimately linked to the public project of pushing national morality. As
Western philosophical and scientific analysis came to dominate Japanese public
debate, arguments centered around the idea of ethics in general, and “national ethics”
in particular, became more reliant on definitions of the nature of philosophy and religion
themselves. For conservative nationalists to argue that the Japanese national ethic was
organic to Japan, and illustrated in “Japanese philosophy,” they needed to be able to
define what philosophy was, and find a Japanese variety. A definition of “Japanese philos-
ophy” was thus reliant on broader Meiji attempts to define the Western concept of
4Sitting at the core of this historical writing was his three-volume history of Confucianism in Japan:
The Philosophy of Japan’s Wang Yang-ming-ist School, The Philosophy of Japan’s Ancient Learning
School, and The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi-ist School (Inoue 1900, 1903, 1905).
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“philosophy” itself. And the definition of what did or did not constitute “philosophy” was
in turn related to the sticky question of what useful social role (if any) should be attributed
to “religion.” This was not only one of the continuing intellectual questions of Meiji-
period scholars, but as controversies like the brief suppression of Buddhism in the
early 1870s demonstrated, one of the pressing political and social ones also. In the
1890s context, and particularly in Inoue’s construction of “Japanese philosophy,” this
question became increasingly integrated into debates on national ideology and religion.
Both Inoue Tetsujirō and his publisher, friend and New Buddhism activist Inoue
Enryō (1858–1919), were key figures in discussions of the 1890s and early 1900s that de-
veloped this definition of the place of Confucianism and Buddhism in “philosophy”
through redefining the field itself (Snodgrass 2003). Inoue Tetsujirō`s exposition of Con-
fucianism as moral philosophy in his publications between 1900 and 1905 was in content
and method quite different from Enryō`s “integration” of “Buddhist philosophy” and
“Western philosophy” from the late 1880s. But it rested on the same foundations.
Those foundations basically emphasized the separation of the political and individual
spheres, supported by the separation of the categories of philosophy and religion. Con-
fucianism as “philosophy” was thus positioned within the modern pantheon of rational
knowledge, with a particular role in affecting discussions on politics. But the religious
community, ritual, or practice elements were removed. Most modern scholars of Confu-
cianism over the past century, including in the West, whether they realize it or not, have
followed this model.
It is important to be aware of the consequences of this socially decontextualized ap-
proach to religion, at least in the historical example we have from Japan. This redefinition
of Confucianism not only allowed it to function within modern categories and interact
with modern institutions like the state, but more importantly it allowed Inoue Tetsujirō
to associate Confucian values as philosophy with pretty much whatever he wanted. Con-
fucianism, isolated from any established religious institutions, set social base, or context,
became to some extent an open box or empty category into which whatever imperatives
of nationalist imperialism needed to be inserted could be. Such an “open-box” character-
istic can be seen in many forms of modernized Confucianism. As no more than an intel-
lectual system of values, divorced from social institutions and practice, theoretically any
value or belief that could be related to the text could also be claimed for Confucianism.
This in fact conforms to Talal Asad’s theories on the nature of individualized faith-based
religion in post-Enlightenment society, which “render[s] any philosophy that performs
such a function [individual belief providing consolation] into religion” (Asad 1993, 46).
Indeed, Confucianism as a category became so pliable in mid-twentieth-century Japan
that fascist war criminals even used Confucian values as part of their defense in the
Tokyo Trials (Kiyose [1947] 1995, 38). “Confucian values,” once divorced from the
history of social practice, could be, and are, interpreted to mean almost anything.
CONFUCIANISM AS RELIGION
Studying Confucianism as philosophy, then, is far from an innocent practice nor one
without a past. It interacts deeply with the history of political modernity in East Asia. Phi-
losophy as a peg is usually associated with ethnic or civilizational labels—Confucianism is
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“Chinese philosophy” or “Asian philosophy,” part of “Eastern tradition,” or in the 1930s
and 40s “Japanese empire.” In other words, labeling Confucianism as philosophy rein-
forces is cultural-specificity and its political valency, and of course obfuscates the sociality
of its ritual systems and culturally embedded practice.
Many of the books in the current boom in Confucian studies, however, are beginning
to take a different approach. For instance, Chen Yong’s Confucianism as Religion (2013),
while not itself examining Confucianism as a religion, nonetheless provides an intellectual
history that unmasks the politics inherent in the problematic of modern categorization.
Anna Sun’s Confucianism as a World Religion (2013) represents a much larger-scale
attempt to overcome problems in past scholarship. Ultimately, Sun fails to give Confu-
cianism a global face, but she does attempt to station it methodologically in the sociality
of religion, and notably in the sociological and anthropological academic milieu the study
of religion currently enjoys. On the other hand, the difficulty she experiences using this
approach to render a meaningful conclusion, and her ultimate regression to a political
thesis based on a normative reading of Bellah, are cautionary.
Similarly, many of the articles in Yang and Tamney’s collection Confucianism and
Spiritual Traditions in Modern China and Beyond (2012) are path-breaking in attempt-
ing to analyze the growth of contemporary Confucianism in social terms from the ground
up. But even in this collection we are also confronted by some problematic value-based
interpretations of the Confucian revival. For instance, Kang Xiaoguang argues in the
opening essay of this volume that the resurgence in Confucianism should be seen as a
“cultural nationalist movement,” which has emerged as a result of the particular stage
of socioeconomic development in which China now finds itself. That all sounds fine,
except that Kang, a professor in the School of Public Administration at Renmin Univer-
sity, the university traditionally responsible for the political training of senior CCP cadres,
also makes a point of singing the praises of this rise in cultural nationalism that will “con-
tribute to world peace and ultimately to China’s national interests” (Yang and Tamney
2012, 71). Kang follows the typical trend of optimistic nationalist exceptionalism by con-
cluding that “China’s cultural nationalist movement may shape the fate of not only the
Chinese nation but also the entire world” (72). National exceptionalism somehow
seems to always engage “fate” and ultimately the “world.” These are, after all, the con-
tours of the ideology of Protestant providence and manifest destiny that underlay the
process of global modernization, and of which these readings of Confucianism still
seem in awe (Stanley 1990).
Many works in the recent scholarly boom in Confucianism similarly use Weberian or
other meta-theoretical approaches to locate Confucian values within political systems.
They thereby dislocate Confucianism from any social or historical base, and follow the
twentieth-century trend of reifying Confucianism as the weltanschauung of a particular
culture—a reaction to and replacement of the positioning of Protestantism in Western
high capitalism (Veer 2001). Notably, many recent books on Confucianism, including
those by Sun, Yang, and Chen, unwittingly facilitate this kind of cultural reification by ig-
noring Confucianism outside the Chinese context. This is perhaps the greatest danger to
be discerned in the current trend of scholarship on Confucianism: its refusal to seriously
study Confucianism outside Chinese cultural settings. Although scholars probably do not
intend a China-centric approach to lead to cultural reification, it ineluctably will. This is
clear if we think about Christianity as a comparative referent. Scholarship on Christianity
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that only talks about Christianity in a Western context inevitably (although often unwit-
tingly) reinforces cultural visions of Christianity that were implicit in modern imperial-
ism. Many of the problems faced by Christianity today, and over the last three
centuries, have sprung from this unfortunate cultural habit of equating Christianity
with Western European civilization. We must remember, however, that there was
nothing innocent in the development of this habit through late medieval and early
modern Europe, and particularly as part of the rise of modern capitalist imperialism in
the nineteenth century. The politics of a culture pretending it owns a religious tradition
are of course related to the ideas of cultural manifest destiny and providence discussed
earlier and reflected in the quote from Hatoyama Ichirō that opens this essay. Much
current scholarship can be seen to be digging the same trench for Confucianism.
On the other hand, despite this Sinocentricism in terms of content, the form in which
much of this current scholarship on Confucianism is published does imbue some hope.
The nature of the current discourse on Confucianism, in form if not content, is patently
international in terms of the language it is published in, the publishers and distributors of
the texts, and the scholarly discourse space it inhabits. This is perhaps the greatest differ-
ence between the revival of Confucianism in 1930s Japan and in contemporary China—
the current Chinese revival sits in a globalized scholarly and analytic framework, it is
being discussed rationally, and it is open. Whether that makes any difference to the
outcome, we shall have to wait and see.
List of References
ASAD, TALAL. 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Chris-
tianity and Islam. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
BELLAH, ROBERT N. [1967] 2005. “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 134(4):40–55.
——. 1985. Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan. London: Collier
Macmillan Publishers.
BREEN, JOHN, and MARK TEEUWEN. 2010. A New History of Shinto. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell.
CALLAHAN, WILLIAM A. 2012. “Sino-Speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of
History.” Journal of Asian Studies 71(1):33–55.
CHAN, JOSEPH CHO WAI. 2014. Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for
Modern Times. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
CHEN, WEIGANG. 2014. Confucian Marxism: A Reflection on Religion and Global Justice.
Leiden: Brill.
CHEN, YONG. 2013. Confucianism as Religion: Controversies and Consequences. Leiden:
Brill.
COLLCUTT, MARTIN. 1991. “The Legacy of Confucianism in Japan.” In The East Asian
Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation, ed. Gilbert Rozman,
111–54. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
COHEN, PAUL. 1985. “The Quest for Liberalism in the Chinese Past: Stepping Stone to a
Cosmopolitan World or the Last Stand of Western Parochialism?: A Review of ‘The
Liberal Tradition in China.’” Philosophy East and West 35(3):305–10.
DE BARY, WM. THEODORE. 1983. The Liberal Tradition in China. Neo-Confucian Studies.
Hong Kong: Chinese University Press; New York: Columbia University Press.
280 Kiri Paramore
——. 2013. The Great Civilized Conversation: Education for a World Community.
New York: Columbia University Press.
FAN, RUIPING, and ERIKA YU, eds. 2011. The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contempo-
rary China. Dordrecht: Springer.
FAURE, BERNARD. 1993. Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the
Chan Tradition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
FOGEL, JOSHUA A. 2004. The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern
Western Civilization to China. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University
of California Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies.
FUNG, YU-LAN. 1966. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: Free Press.
GIRARDOT, N. J. 2002. The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge’s Oriental Pil-
grimage. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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——. 1900. Nihon Yōmeigakuha no Tetsugaku [The philosophy of Japan’s Wang
Yang-ming-ist school]. Tokyo: Fuzanbō.
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